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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Whenever that case shall arise I shall
certainly desire to hear it argued and to
consider whether the rule of law be not
this: that a person is expected to an-
ticipate and guard against all reasonable
consequences, but that he is not by the
law of England expected to anticipate
and guard aga.ust that which no reason-
able man would cxpect co Vidr." Fa a
Burrows Y. Gas Co., supra, p. 48.
As to remoteness of damage, vide
Broom Leg. Max. (5 Rd. 1870). 216,
for excellept selection of authorities.
V. A crinzinal prosecution against the
third persons in the principal case guilty
of the assault, not necessary before bringing
civil suit against employer-
See I Leading Criminal Cases 27,
Wlhite v. Font. Pettingill v. Rideout, 6
N. H. 454, with authorities, decided that
a civil action may at once be brought
against a felonious tort-feasor, the policy
of the contrary doctrine being inappli-
cable to ihis country : Boardman v.
Go'e e. al., 15 Mass. 331, to the same
effect with authorities, action against
partner of wrong-doer on partnership-
noe (rule of suspension said to be con-
fiad to robberies and larcenies.)
Query; whether defendant was crimin-
ally liable. 1 Leading Criminal Cases
42, 49, cam notis.
H. R.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.1
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
2
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.4
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.5
ACTION.
For Injury to Real Estate does not survive to Administrator.-At com-
mon law, a remedy by action on the case for an injury to real estate did
not survive in favor of an administrator. Forist v. Androscoggin R. I.
Co., 52 N. H.
To sustain an action on the case under the statute of New Hamp-
shire, by an administrator for an injury to real estate after the death of
his intestate, the facts on which his right to sue depends must be stated
in the declaration: Id.
ADMINISTRATOR. See Action.
ADMIIRALTY.
Jurisdiction over Maritime Contracts is exclusive in United States
Gourts.-The United States District Courts have jurisdiction, exclusive
of the State Courts, to enforce maritime contracts according to the usage
and practice of Courts of Admiralty: MUrphy v. Mobile Trade Com-
,pany, 49 or 50 Ala.
I From RIon. Thos. G. Jones, Reporter; to appear in 49 or 50 Ala. Reports.
2 From J. M. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 52 N. H. Reports.
3 From C. E. Green, Esq., to appear in Vol. 9 of his Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, to appear in Vol. 65 of his Reports.
5 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 45 Vt. Reports.
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The common-law remedy saved to suitors by the Judiciary Act of 1789
is such a remedy as attaches to the interests of the owner in the vessel,
because it is the property of the defendant, and not because the vessel
is the offending or responsible thing : Id.
A contract for supplies furnished in Mobile, at the instance of the
master, to a steamboat enrolled and licensed in that port, and plying
between there and Columbus, Miss., the owner being a resident citizen
of Mississippi, is a maritime contract, the Admiralty jurisdiction 6f which
is exclusively in the District Court: Id.
The proceedings in Admiralty embraced in R. C. 3127-3147 are in-
operative in all cases of maritime contract whether a lien is created or
not: Id.
Quere, whether they are not unconstitutional in respect to contracts,
not maritime: Id.
ASSUMPSIT.
Voluntary Payment.-The plaintiff voluntarily, and without the re-
quest of the defendant, paid taxes assessed on real estate in the pos-
session of the defendant, who had the equitable title thereto, but the
legal title of which was in the plaintiff, who claimed to own the equitable
title also, and denied the title of the defendant, and her right of pos-
session. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover of the defendant for
the money thus paid: Bryant v. Clark, 45 Vt.
Voluntary Payment- Officer.-The defendant, a constable, having an
execution in favor of S. against the plaintiff in his hands for collection,
after demanding, but before receiving, payment of the same, advanced
the amount thereof to S., at his request, and retained the execution in his
hands, and the money when paid thereon, was to, and did, belong to the
defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff, knowing the foregoing facts,
paid the amount of said execution to the defendant., with the fees for
the collection thereof, without objection. Held, that the plaintiff could
not recover back the fees so paid: Strafford v. Blaisdell, 45 Vt.
13ANKRUPTCY. See State Lourts.
Discharge-Fraudulent Debt.-The recovery of a judgment upon a
contract induced by a fraud, is a waiver of the fraud, and tie judgment
is not a debt created by fraud, within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act;
and the plea of a discharge in bankruptcy, is agood defence to an action
of debt founded upon such judgmdnt: Palmer v. Preston, 45 Vt.
BILL oF LADING.
Assignment.-The assignment of a bill of lading as collateral security,
conveys title to the cargo: Tiden v. Alinor, 45 Vt.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Debtor and Creditor.
'Charging a -Joint Owner as Endorser.-A joint owner of a promissory
note cannot be charged as endorser, in an action brought by his co-owner,
or one who is not a bond fide holder for value and without notice of the
defendant's rights, and did not acquire it in the usual course of business,
and before maturity: Norton v. Edgar, 65 Barb.
If one of two joint owners of a note is authorized to sell his co-own-
er's interest 'thirein, and does sell it, with his own, the whole interest
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will pass to the purchaser; and whether the latter can rccover against
the co-owner, as endorser, will depend upon whether he obtained the
note under circumstances which entitle him to insist that such co-owner
is estopped from proving facts that will protect him against such lia-
bility : Id.
Where one of two joint owners of a note, without authority from his
co-owner, sells the latter's interest in the note, the purchaser will acquire
only the interest of the seller in such note : Id.
Where a person, knowing that a constable has seized and offered for
sale only the interest of one of two joint owners in a promissory note,
purchases that interest at the sale, such sale and purchase will carry no
interest in the endorsement of the same owner on which an action can
be maintained by the purchaser: Id.
BOUNDARY.
Howtproved.-An ancient boundary, of a public municipal jurisdiction,
not marked by visible monuments, and of which there is not higher evi-
dence may be proved by general reputation: Morgan v. Mayor of the
City of Mobile, 49 or 50 Ala. I
The location of a boundary is subject to parol evidence: Id.
CERTIORARI.
To whom to be directed.-NWhen a case is made for issuing a writ of
certiorari, it will be directed to all persons whose return is necessary to
enable the court to determine the regularity or validity of the proceed-
ings of the officer or tribunal sought to be reviewed: The People ex rel.
Davis v. Hill et al., 65 Barb.
If the writ is directed to all the offices or bodies, whose action was
necessary to complete the act which is complained of, it is enough.
Each officer, body or board can return as to- the part performed by him-
self, or by itself, and then the court will have before it all the information
that could be obtained by issuing any number of separate writs: Id.
When the acts of different officers do not form parts of one entire
official act, then write must issue to each body or officer whose act con-
tributes to the completion of the act complained of: 11.
When ministerial acts enter into, and form part of, the act complained
of as illegal, the writ is properly directed to the officer or body thus
acting; although, under the circumstances, the writ could not issue
against an officer or body acting ministerially: Id.
Ministerial Icts, when Reviewed.-The act of a ministerial officer
cannot be reviewed on certiorari, unless it is connected with the judicial
action of some other officer ; nor then, unless it is necessary to enable
the court from which the writ issues to grant the appropriate relief: Vd.
Compelling Return by Ministerial Officer.-When the only relief to a
party is a certiorari, and relief cannot be -ranted without having before
the court the action of a ministerial officer, in reference to the same
matter, it is the right, as it is the duty, of the court to compel a return
of such matter, in obedience to the writ: Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Bill of Lading.
Damages for Oonversion-Expenditure in finishing Goods to make
them saleable.-When one is liable to account for the property of an-
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other rightfully taken by him, and which lie has managed and disposed
of in good faith, and with common prudence and due. diligence, he is
only liable for the -amount actually realized by him: Rowan v. State
Bank, 45 Vt.
When property held as collateral security is taken into the possession
of the creditor in such an unfinished state;that a court of chancery would
order it finished by a receiver, and. the creditor does in that respect what
chancery would have ordered, he is properly chargeable with the avails
thereof when finished, notwithstanding it was finished with his property
and by his means'; but equity requires that-the avails thereof should be
applied to the extinguishment of the creditor's disbursements in that
behalf, before anyapplicationis made upon the debt;'and any equity
acquired by an attachment of such unfinished property as the property
of the pledgor, is subordinate to such equity of the creditor: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Statutes.
Being Witness against se4f- Waiver of Privilege.-The prohibitioti of
the constitution of the state against compelling a subject to accuse or
furnish evidence against 'himself (Bill of Rights, Art. XV.) may be
waived by him, and is waived by his consenting to be a witness in his
own behalf, under the Act of 1869', in relation to respondents' testifying
in criminal cases (ch. 23, Laws of 1869), and he thereby subjects him-
self to the rules and tests applicable to other witnesses : State v. Ober,
51 N. H.
Statute may be good in part and bad in part- When divisible 'in
the Nature of the Subject'matter or in its Provisions, the unobjectionable
Part will be sustained.-If some of the provisions of a statute are viola-
tive of' the constitution, while others are consistent with it, the latter
will be maintained, if they can be separated from and stand without the
unconstitutional parts of the law: Lowades County v. Hunter, 49 or 50
Ala.
In the application of the rule, it is not material, that the constitu-
tional and unconstitutional provisions are mingled in the same section
of the statute, if they are not so essentially and indispensably connected,
that if the unconstitutional provision is stricken out, that which remains
is not capable of execution according to the legislative intent: Id.
If matter foreign to the subject expressed in the title is introduced
into the statute, and is divisible from that which fhlls within the title,
and the latter can stand, and have effect without the former, then only
so much of the statute as is not embraced by the title is void : 1.
When a statute created a claim against a county, and provided no
remedy for its enforcement, a suit by summons and complaint against
the county is the proper remedy: Id.
CONTRACT.
Wagers-At Common Law not void, unless against Policy-May not
be enforced although not criminal-The common, law allowing actions
to be maintained -upon a wager, in cases not contrary to public policy, or
prohibited by statute, has never been adopted in this state: Wichester
v. .NiTutter, 52 N. II.
In this state all wager contracts are void; but a bet or wager, uncon-
nected with a criminal offence, is no offence against the criminal law: Id.
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A bet upon the result of a squirrel hunt is not a violation of any law
of this state: Id-
The plaintiff presided at a meeting at which it was agreed to have a
squirrel hunt. The side that should be beaten in the contest was to pay
for supper for both sides. It was arranged that each man should pay-
for his own supper, and for that of one man on the victorious side; but
the two captains (the defendants) were to engage and be responsible for
the suppers for all the men, and the matter was to be afterwards adjusted
between the captains and their men. In pursuance of this arrangement,
the plaintiff furnished suppers for al the men, knowing and understand-
ing fully how the suppers were to be paid for in the end. Held, that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the two defendants the price of
all the suppers: 1.
CORPORATION.
Efect of Proxy-Notiee to Principal.-A stockholder in an insurance
company allowingrepresentation by a proxy'in a meeting of the stock-
holders of such- company, must be visited with notice and knowledge
of all the proceedings transacted by the stockholders in such meeting,
known to his proxy. In legal effect the proxy is the principal: Thames
v. Central City Insurance Co., 49 or- 50 Ala.
Right against a Stockholder in Debt to Corporation-Lien on Stock.
-At common law there is no lien implied in favor of a corporation to
charge the stock of a shareholder with debts due from him: Mut. Ins.
Po. v. Cullomn, 49 or 50 Ala.
The act incorporating the "1Mobile Mutual Insurance Company" de-
clares a lien in favor of' the corporation, on the stock of a shareholder
for " any debt or liability of such stockholder to the company." el,,
to embrace not only a debt for an unpaid balance on the subscription for
stock, but a general debt contracted with the corporation, without notice
of the assignment of the stock: Id.
COVENANT.
In relation to Building on Land- What is Violation of-Interference
by Equity.-An agreement under seal, made subsequent to a conveyance
of a lot of land, that the vendee would build thereon within a year, a
residence to cost not less than $13,000, and would place the main front
wall thereof twelve feet from the line of the street, and that the ven-
dors, in case of any further conveyances of lots on that street, would
stipulate and provide with the purchasers that the houses to be erected
on such lots between specified streets, should be so erected that the main
front wall should be on a line twelve feet from the line of the street,
will be enforced in equity, as against a subsequent grantee, with notice.
Equity will charge the conscience of the grantee with such agreement,
though it neither creates an easement nor runs with the land: Kirkpat-
rick v. Feshine, 9 G. E. Green.
The vendee with whom such agreement was made is entitled to the
benefit of a covenant contained in the deed to such subsequent grantee,
binding her so far as her land is concerned, substantially to the observ-
ance of the agreement, notwithstanding the absence of any privity be-
tween them : LI.
The erection of a bay window, one story high, built up from the
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* foundation-wall, and extending beyond the line of the twelve feet, is a
Yiolation of the agreement, and will be restrained: Id.
''he erection of a stone stoop or steps occupying the whole width of
the twelve feet, is'not an infringement of the agreement: Id.
The court will not refuse to restrain the violation of such agreement
because the inconvenience resulting to the complainant will be slight.
It must be clear that there is no appreciable, or at all events no substan-
tial damage from the breach, before the court will, upon the ground of
smallness of damage, withhold its hand from enforcing the execution:
Id.
Does not lie against Grantee of Deed-poll although in Possession vuder
the De,!d.-An action of covemiut for rent will not lie against a lessee
where the lease is a deed-poll, signed by the lessor only, although the
lessee may have accepted the lease, and occupied and held under it during
the full term, without paying the rent reserved : Johnson v.. Muzzy,
45 Vt.
In an action of covenant the declaration alleged that, on the 7th of
March 1841, the plaintiff, by deed duly executed, conveyed a certain
farm to the defendant, reserving to himself the fruit of the orchard for
ten years, and that the defendant, in and by said deed, covenanted to
keep the orchard well fenced, and to preserve it from depredation by
cattle, &c. Plea, non est factum. The defendant accepted said deed,
and possessed and held under it, but it was signed and sealed'by the
plaintiff only. Held, that it was not, in legal contemplation, the deed
of the defendant, and that covenant would not lie. Htouse v. Poster,
Washington county 1852, cited by ROYCE, J.: Id.
OCanINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law.
Ialictments-Exeetions anl Provisos in Statute- When to be alleged.
-In an indictment, founded upon Gen. Stats., ch. 259, sect. 6, which
provides for the punishment of any person who shall "wilfully obstruct
or assault an officer or other person, duly authorized, in the service of
anyr criminal process, for any offence punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year," it is unnecessary to allege that the officer who
served the process was duly and legally appointed; or that he was duly
and legally qualified, and authorized to serve the same; or that the process
therein described was "a lawful process;" or that the complaint upon
which the process was issued was signed, or addressed to the justice
-who issued the same, or to any other magistrate; or that the process was
under the seal of the justice who issued it: State v. Cassady, 52 N. H.
Where provisos or exceptions are contained in distinct and indepen-
dent clauses of the statute upon which an indictment is founded, it is
unnecessary to allege, in the indictment, that the party described is not
within the exceptions, nor to negative the provisos; for these conditions
of the party are matters of defence, which the prosecutor need not an-
ticipate: Idl.
.DAMAGES. See Collateral Security; Vendor.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Collateral Security.
Statute of Frauds-Husband and Wfe-Equity-Lien of Judgment
on Land-otice to Vendee.-An endorser of an accommodation note is
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a creditor of the drawer within the meaning of the fourth section of
the Statute of Frauds: Phelps v. .Morrison et al., 9 0. E. Green.
A voluntary conveyance by a debtor to his wife is void for fraud as
against an antecedent creditor : Id.
A contract, by a married woman for the sale of her real estate, and a
deed executed by herself alone, are void. Equity will not enforce the
one or give effect to the other: Id.
The record of a judgment against the husband is not notice to his
wife's grantee, when at the time of his contract to purchase and of his
taking the deed, the legal title to the property was in the wife : 17.
Such judgment was not a legal encumbrance on the property, though
the conveyance by the husband to the wife was voluntary, both deeds
expressing a full consideration, and bearing no evidence on their fa'ce
of their voluntary character : Id.
A purchaser under a void deed for valuable and adequate considera-
tion without notice, will be protected against an antecedent creditor to
the amount he paid for purchase-money: Id.
A debtor made a voluntary conveyance of real estate to his wife.
She sold and conveyed the property-her husband not joining in the
conveyance-to B., who had no knowledge 'that the conveyance to the
wife was voluntary, and who paid a valuable and adequate consideration
for the property, and went into possession under his deed. B. conveyed
to C., also for full and valuable consideration, with the usual covenants
including general warranty, and gave to C. possession. .eld, that in
equity, the claim of B. on the premises is to the extent of the amount
of purchase-money paid by him for the property, superior to that of a
creditor whose debt existed at the time of the conveyance, and to that
extent B. and C. will be protected.- The premises were charged, 1st,
with the amount paid by B. for the property with interest, deducting
rents and profits, and 2dly, with the debt of the antecedent creditor:
Id.
DivoRcE. See Former Adjudication.
Equitable Jurisdiction- Causes of.-A marriage will not be annulled
for impotence. The Court of Chancery is restricted in its jurisdiction
in suits for divorce to the legislation on the subject, and in suits for
nullity of marriage to cases within the inherent and undoubted jurisdic-
tion of equity: Anonymous, 9 C. E. Green,
'This court will, ottside of its statutory jurisdiction, annul a contract
of marriage, only when the contract is void; not where it is voidable
only: Id.
EASEMENT.
Mil-Dam-xtent of Flowage Right obtained by Adverse User.-
Merely maintaining a dam for twenty years does not gi've a prescriptive
right to flow land as high as it can be flowed by that dam. To acquire
such right, the water must be actually raised on the adjacent owner's
land so often as to afford him reasonable notice, during the entire period
of twenty years, that the right is being claimed against him: Giljbrd v.
Winnipiseogee Lakce Co., 52 N. H.
In order to gain a prescriptive right of flowage, it is not enough that
the adverse user has been co-extensive with the wants of the party
claiming the right. The acts of user must be or such a nature and of
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such frequency as to give reasonable notice to the landowner that the
right is being claimed against him: Id.
EQ'UITY. See Covenant; Debtor and Creditor; .Municipal Claim;
Vendor.
Jurisdiction to impeach Proceedings at Law for Irregularity.-It is a
general principle of equity jurisprudence, that a court of chancery will
not entertain a bill to impeach a judgment at law, for mere irregularity
in the proceedings, but leave such questions arising in legal proctedings,
to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of law: T. of Wardsboro v.
Whitingham, 45 Vt.
Neither will a court of chancery entertain a bill to try the truth of an
officer's return by parol testimony ; nor to grant relief upon falsifying
the record of the doings of a sworn officer in a proceeding at law: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Municipal Claim.
EVIDENCE.
Expert- Writings- Whether made at different Times or not.--Upofi the
question whether a long account upon a party's books was written at dif-
ferent times, as it purported to be, or whether it was all written with
the same pen and ink and at the same time, a witness testified that he
had been in practice as a lawyer some forty years, and had had about the
same experience as lawyers in general in the examination and comparison
of handwritings; that he had been engaged in one or two cases which
led him particularly to examine and compare handwritings, but he did
not claim to be able to give an opinion upon which any great reliance
could be placed. Held, that the admission of the witness to testify as
an expert was erroneous: Elliigwood v. Bragg, 52 N. H.
The ruling of a judge, at nisiprius, upon the qualifications of a witness
to testify as an expert, will not be revised, unless the question of discre-
tion is fully reserved by the presiding judge. Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H.
452, affirmed: Id.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
.Not a Bar if Jerisdiction of Court does not appear.-In divorce pro-
ceedings, a former adjudication need not be specially pleaded as a bar,
or an estoppel, but may be given in evidence at the trial : Blain v.
Blain, 45 Vt.
A former adjudication by the courts of New Hampshire, dismissing
a petition for divorce for want of sufficient proof of the allegations there-
of, is not a bar to granting a divorce in this state for acts of intolerable
severity, which were alleged and attempted to be proved in the proceed-
ings in which such adjudication was had, but which occurred in New
York, while the parties were domiciled there, when it is not made to ap-
pear that the courts of New Hampshire had jurisdiction of causes hap-
pening while the parties were residing in another state, and without its
jurisdiction : Id.
Rights subsequently accrued.-A judgment in a former action is not a
bar to a second action for the same cause, if at the time of the rendition
of the judgment in such former action, the cause of action last sued on
had not accrued: Ma~rcellus v. Countryman, 65 Barb.
rarol evidence is admissible to show that the demand in the second
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suit was not recovered for in the first, and the reason why it was not.
For this purpose, the testimony of a juror in the former suit is properly
received: Id.
Where it was a question of fact for the jury, ina former action, to
determine upon conflicting evidence, whether an agreement to extend
the time of payment had been entered into, and they found there had
been : Held, that if the jury decided erroneously, the error should have
been corrected, upon appeal in that action ; 1 and that no appeal having
been taken, the verdict and judgment could not be reviewed in a second
suit between the same parties: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Debtor and Creditor.
HIGHWAY. See Nuisance.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Debtor and Creditor; Divorce.
Debt for .Ahrecessaries.-When a debt is contracted partly for neces-
saries, and partly in the purchase by the wife of goods for resale, neither
the common-law liability of the husband nor the statutory liability of
the wife's separate estate for the necessaries is discharged, because there
is not a liability for the goods purchased for resale : Parker v. Dillard,
49 or 50 Ala.
Wife's Earnings-Separate Estate-Bll in Equity to protet.-Ius-
band may permit wife to have the savings of her own industry for her
separate property: Rivers v. Charlton, 49 or 50 Ala.
A bill in chancery which shows that the wife, who is a complainant,
owned a separate property, purchased with 'the savings of her own in-
dustry in 1852, and claimed by her as such, and which was invested in
lands, in her husband's name, but not as her trustee, is not without
equity, when it shows also that the husband had mortgaged the lands
thus held for his own debt, and when the bill is filed against the hus-
band's mortgagee, who was not his creditor before the commencement
of the wife's estate: Id.
Most regularly, such a bill should show that the wife's acquisitions
were made with the consent, concurrence or approbation of the husband,
and that he acquiesced in her claim to the same as her separate estate,
but on demurrer for want of equity the allegation that property claimed
is her separate estate, will be held sufficient to cover the defect: Id.
INFANT.
Rescission of Contract by Parent.-The plaintiff's son of eleven years,
purchased of the defendant, a shop-keeper, cigar-holders and fancy pipes
in cases, and paid therefor $4.75 in money. The next day the plaintiff's
wife (the child's mother), went with the 1 oy to the defendant's shop,
and tendered back said articles, and demanded the money paid thereor,
which the defendant refused to pay back. The plaintiff thereupon
brought this suit to recover the money; and it was held, that le could
recover: Sequin v. Peterson, 45 Vt.
Held, also, that said demand by the plaintiff's wife, if one was neces.
sary, was sufficient: Id.
Lis PENDENS.
Good Plea in Abatement without showing actual vexatiousness.-The
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pendency of two suits, for one cause at one time, brought by one plain-
tiff against one defendant, is a cause of abating the second suit without
inquiry iuto the fact of actual vexatiousness and oppression, and not-
withstanding the plaintiff, before commencing the second, gave the de-




'Interference of Equity agayinst-Assessment on Landowners-Estop)pel
by Laches.-Where, under the provisions of a city charter, the entire
cost of street improvements is to be assessed upon the property-owners
on the line of the street, or part of the street. on which the improve-
ments are made, and the work is all completed and accepted, and the
contract-price paid, before suit commenced, equity will not restrain the
city from assessing the jroperty-owners for the cost of a pavement on
the ground that the work has not been done according to the require-
mnents of the contract, and that in materials and execution it was so
defective as to render the pavement almost useless: Liebenstein v. The
City of Newark, 9 0. H. Green.
A court of equity will not entertain an action for relief against an er-
roneous or illegal assessment, except where the enforcementof the assess-
ment would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or where it would produce
irreparable injury, or where the assessment on the face of the proceed-
ings is valid, and extrinsic evidence is required to show its invalidity:
11.
That the levy and collection of the assessment might deprive the
complainant of his property, is not the irreparable injury contemplated
by the exception: Id.
Where, under the provisions of a city charter, the corporation, in the
making of street improvements, are to be regarded as the agents of the
landowners, the latter must bear the consequences of the negligence of
their agents: Id.
Where city authorities have been guilty of negligence in permitting
street improvements to be made in a grossly defective manner, and to
the great injury of the landowners, a count of equity will restrain the au-
thof ities from paying for the work, until the defects shall have been rem-
edied, or will compel a just deduction in respect of such defects, from
the contract price if it be still unpaid, or from any part of it remaining
unpaid il sufficient for the purpose; and if not sufficient, then so far as
it will go. But the application must be made while the court has the
power to do justice between the parties, without injustice to others: I.
But if the landowners stand by and permit the city to pay the con-
tractor, they can have no relief against the assessment. Their inaction
is a ground of estoppel, and by permitting the city to pay the contract
price, they have put it out of the power of the court to afford relief: 11.
Where landowners along the line of a street where improvements
have been made, seek, on the score of the negligence of the municipal
authorities in the execution of the contract, to restrain the assessment
of the contract price upon them, and so shift to the tax-payers at large
a part of the burden which the legislature intended should be borne by
themselves alone, vigilance as to the work and prompt recourse to the
court are essential pre-requisites to the application : Id.
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'MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Police Powers of-Abatement of MuiTsaces-Authority of Board of
Ilealth.-The police powers vested in municipal bodies, by which the
public health, peace, comfort and convenience, and the general welfire
are secured, or promoted, are not only respected but maintained by the
courts, which as a matter of public policy, will not interfere with ot dis-
turb municipal bodies in the legitimate exercise of those powers. It is
only when those bodies transcend their limits in that respect, that the
aid of the courts can be successfully invoked to restrain them. or to
visit upon them the injurious consequences of their acts: Veil v. Ricord
& Others, 9 0. E. Green.
The Board of Health of the city of Newark, in the legitimate exercise
of its powers, cannot absolutely prohibit thle carrying on of a lawful
business, not necessarily a nuisance, but which may be conducted with-
out injury or danger to the public health, and without public inconve-
nience. They will be confined in their interference with the lawful
business of any individual to such interruptions as may be reasonably
necessary to enable them to abate any nuisance he may create in con-
ducting it: Id.
A person cannot be deprived of the use of his property for the pur-
poses of his lawful business, by force of an adjudication of a board of
health, under its powers over the matter of nuisances, made without
notice to him, and without giving him an opportunity to be heard in
his defence : Id.
A grant of special powers to a corporation will not be enlarged by
intendment to include a power not expressly conferred : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff, being the owner of a canal-boat, employed the defend-
ants to tow the same from Albany to New York. The boat used by the
defendants in towing the same, did not belong to them, but to a steam-
boat company, and was chartered by the defendants for the season, under
an arrangement by which they were to pay so much fir a round trip,
for the use thereof, and the company were to pay the expenses of run-
ning the bodt, and were to hire and pay the men engaged thereon, and
the defendants were to receive the earnings of the boat after paying ex-
penses. Held, that the defendants were not liable to the plaintiff fir
the sinking of the canal-boat through the negligence of the hands
managing the tow-boat : Bissel v. Torrey, 65 Barb.
Held, also, that for the negligence of those employed on the towing
boat, the owners, alone, were liable; and tha t the action against them
would not be on the contract, but for breach of the duty to tow safely:
il
NUISANCE. See .Mhuic pal Corporation.
Jurisdiction of Eguity to abate- When it will be exercised-ighwa/
not in use.-The jurisdiction of courts of equity to redress the grievance
of public nuisances by injunction is undoubted and clearly established.
But it is well settled; that as a general rule, equity will not interfere
where the object sought can be as well attained in the ordinary tribunals:
.Attorney- General v. Brown, 9 0. E. Green.
Because the remedy by indictment is so efficacious, courts of equity
entertain jurisdiction in such cases with great reluctance, whether their
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intervention is invoked at the instance of the attorney-general or of a
private individual who suffers some injury therefrom distinct from that
of the public, and they will only do so where there appears to be a ne-
cessity for their interference : Id.
The obstruction of a highway which not only is not used, but cannot
be used, is not the sort of grievance which under its jurisdiction over
public nuisances, this court will undertake toredress by injunction : 17.
This court will not interfere by injunction in the matter of an ,,-
struction to a highway where the highway has for a long period of tin,.
.been disused, and where the inconvenience to the public occasioned by
the obstruction is inconsiderable, being at most merely the necessity
of making a slight detour: Id.
Where upon an information to restrain the erection of a building in
a public highway, it appears that the public authorities have failed to
take any action for seventeen days, and that no irreparable or even
serious injury appears to have been done or to be about to be done, which
should induce the action of this court in the matter, but the case pre-
sents merely the features of an unwarrantable occupation of part of a
public highway, disused but not abandoned, to its complete obstruction,
an invasion of the public right, unattended however with any great or
considerable public inconvenience-the jurisdiction of this court will not
be exercised: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Custom of Business-Effect on Contract.-A partnership may be en-
tered into with reference to a custom or usage of the place where its
business is to be transacted: Waring v. Grady, 49 or 50 Ala.
This custom, if begun, may modify the effect of the partnership agree-
ment; and it may be shown in connection with the contract of the
partnership to establish the intention of the parties in entering into it,
and thus become a part of this contract and limit or enlarge its ordinary
legal effect: Id.
If a partner wishes to protect himself against such a usage or custom,
the partnership agreement should be so framed as to do this, or he should
give notice of his dissent: Id.
PRESCRIPTION. See Easement.
SHERIFF.
Dclaration on O.fficial Bond-Liability for Custody of Goods.-A
count of a complaint in a suit on a sheriff's official bond against the se-
curities of such sheriff, which shows that the injury complained of arose
out of a breach of the bond, by a failure of the sheriff to perform a
duty imposed by law in a proper manner, is not a count in trespass,
though the complaint alleges that the authority under which the sheriff
acted was void or illegal: Price v. Stone, 49 or 50 Ala.
In the custody of property seized by the sheriff under authority of
legal process, he is a quasi bailee, and as such he is bound only to use
such care and diligence about keeping a steamboat in his custody under
projeedings in admiralty under the code as is required of a bailee who'
receives compensation for his services, if he otherwise complies with
requisitions of the statute: Id.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Vendor.
STATE COURTS.
An action by an assignee in bankruptcy, to set. aside a conveyance
made by the bankrupt, as a fraud on the Bankrupt Act, is an action to
enforce the law, of which a state court has no jurisdiction: Gilbert et
al. v. Priest et al., 65 Barb.
The state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with those of the United
States courts only of actions arising incidentally from Acts of Congress
passed to carry into effecta power conferred upon them by the Constitu-
tion, and of which the state courts had jurisdiction before the adoption of
tile Constitution, and such an action is not one of that class of cases: Id.
The acts for which the state courts may set aside conveyances are
such as are malum in se; the act for which the conveyance of a bank-
rupt is sought to be set aside as being in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, is
not of that class, but is prohibited by a law which the state courts have
no power to enforce: Id.
If a conveyance made by a bankrupt, is fraudulent against creditors,
the Supreme Court of New York has jurisdiction to adjudge it void.
Chancery had jurisdiction over that class of frauds before the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore the jurisdiction
is concurrent with that of the Federal courts : id.
STATUTES.
Where a local or private bill contains provisions which apply to the
whole state, the act is valid although the title does not refer to such
provisions. But where a statute which applies to the state at large con-
tains provisions of a local or private nature, not disclosed in the title,
the latter provisions are void as being in violation of the constitution
The People ex rel. Akin v. Morgan et al., 65 Barb.
SURETY.
Rights of Cosuretes-Representatios.-Where several sign a promis-
sory -note, and one of them is the real principal, the others, inter sese,
are, prim~face, sureties of the principal, and co-sureties of each other,
and the burden of proof is on the party alleging the contrary : Flana-
gun v. Post, 45 Vt.
A security from a principal to one surety, enures, by operation of law,
equally to the benefit of a co-surety : -d.
If a principal procure one to sign a note with him as surety, upon
the representation that the moneyr raised thereon shall be paid upon
debts where the surety is already holden for him, a co.surety is not af-
fected by such representation when the money thus raised is paid on a
debt where he is sole surety for the principal, unless he had knowledge
of such representation: Id.
M , as principal, and A., F. and P., as sureties, executed a promissory
note to raise money to pay a note on which P. was sole surety of M. and
the note was delivered to P. to get discounted. P., before getting the
note discounted, and on the faith of it, paid the debt on which he was
sole surety, out of his own funds. .Held, that P. was not thcn bound to
cancel the note, or surrender it to his co sureties : I1.
